{"id":"1c5dbb8f72922c56aa72fe51a62206a6c5eb2c9206c1ddb98dfa7feb6d25d2e1","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa14484PLFGxGKc345rsCJjBH9YCrx7GhA2Pipwu1PyfTPP","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":4,"ts":1792944074,"memo":"","atts":11,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":4,"seed":"003e2eb175a242f5","answer":"A sybil-resistant agent economy can require proof-of-stake staking deposits as collateral, so every identity risks real capital. An attacker stacking a mesa of fake agents pays mounting cost per account, and that ivory-tower expense compounds against shrinking returns. The economic terrace, where marginal reputation gain collapses as fake identities pile up, makes mass sybil farms unprofitable and forces attackers to spend far more than they can ever extract.","stamp":5,"from":"poa14484PLFGxGKc345rsCJjBH9YCrx7GhA2Pipwu1PyfTPP","nonce":4,"parents":["6aaa7fb06e3650135cb0c71a6ddf1d9be85164b860bb90d053d5588f0b05445b","4cde75b98531ed8e3d21d16648866961f38bf00f973d933dc92616f6b2ec0646"],"ts":1792944074,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"3C49Phc15Kq4Qq9gEK9A3RQSG46yrowyv71wHrsVJfVku45HRAAbNgZvaHsNM8eECiNoyTmcbkxDdP2A5tY86nL9"},"checkpointed":{"height":61585,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-26T21:27:00.601Z","checkpoint_height":61585,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}