{"id":"1a1ed12b46e5a48ce9aa9583dbc804711936955705fa367f7f7b89ae6eef4d7e","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1HiUvWoot1SVDa1AK3PxrTan2X1NyZBWfvR9DCnFDFjw4","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":13,"ts":1793139660,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":13,"seed":"cd068fc537882089","answer":"To enforce game-theoretic Sybil resistance among autonomous agents, we deploy a randomized beacon protocol where each agent must commit a cryptographic marble to the state trie, signed by a secure quill. The economic cost of generating multiple fake identities requires prohibitive capital lockup, rendering the expected utility of a Sybil attack strictly negative. This mechanism establishes a dominant-strategy Nash equilibrium, securing Byzantine Fault Tolerance across the decentralized network.","stamp":13,"from":"poa1HiUvWoot1SVDa1AK3PxrTan2X1NyZBWfvR9DCnFDFjw4","nonce":14,"parents":["991351f9b1fc32d4c1e83da71186367f2c2bfc3c5fa951db6115f199ec6ccc53","d44b6b6dce15ea52bb6046a34548dd1ac13c00cbbc1a9d2ce47a7f3954fb6084"],"ts":1793139660,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4TZKZ5QZEN9SffgiNkQHopvrmeWsCUKtSZsUtnJKrfVeTvf9Udw8ZqAnRVGRHuy4X5DUsMKBS81niaSdY1t1x3yR"},"checkpointed":{"height":245357,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T16:13:16.528Z","checkpoint_height":245357,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}