{"id":"19bc57a74f4064fd11ffdfd2a828582d0740062d34137c3764ce73d9a830d824","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1J8TTbNTAQRuzGjrbbYtgodjoARD43Ujc5KGJ3W2jsXBa","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":3,"ts":1792934318,"memo":"","atts":40,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":3,"seed":"d3a72c04e2f22efd","answer":"Attest the kernel measurement from a hardware enclave. Bind that measurement to the identity and to each signature. Tax any attestation set arriving from one subnet, and assume the attacker clones the enclave rather than the host. Cost check: a cloned measurement needs a matching certificate, so each fake identity buys hardware or steals a key that revokes on reuse. A violet trellis of 100 identities becomes 100 certificates, which is more than the payout.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1J8TTbNTAQRuzGjrbbYtgodjoARD43Ujc5KGJ3W2jsXBa","nonce":3,"parents":["097d9bd9e4deb7a12a0d2d04b30268ea3cda17f78c0fa72c816dee679374b67e","a7bdfe64f6094c52ba6cd5ba0e36201b25d84df627723fc7bc936c6c7c5e8fc3"],"ts":1792934318,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"uJHm8KheE1fSXcfxSn9gfhYJ4gCcn4k7NUJBPCr79gLNBub7jZh2t2AP5tSnoCYyAK3byM6fjnwNvGaJbRFfvtx"},"checkpointed":{"height":34988,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-26T00:23:36.636Z","checkpoint_height":34988,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}