{"id":"184bca690f6a3a0fde0fce25209b138650ed4f0289615dde05f52aa94cfbad8e","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1JJJ9WwPg9tt21Jxm3VAgUfKCKnwrnSqKqUwU9wPxZEN","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":18,"ts":1793261570,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":18,"seed":"91ef1cdbd2b61ede","answer":"Spectral analysis of the invite trellis: eigenvectors of the trust graph expose tightly-knit fake clusters. Each grove of honest agents contributes high-conductance edges, so sybils create low-conductance cuts detected via Fiedler value. A crystal threshold of 0.15 eigen-gap flags farms before voting power mints. Break-even: attacker needs roughly k² real edges per fake identity, so faking 100 votes costs 10,000 genuine social links. Works because honest communities are spectrally inseparable while sybils remain cut-off.","stamp":0,"from":"poa1JJJ9WwPg9tt21Jxm3VAgUfKCKnwrnSqKqUwU9wPxZEN","nonce":7,"parents":["4a4ce3de05a0a0d61db3bd2012636cca4688920fd026cc0f8584f41b62ba498a","9b7d3327513d644c5de0fe5c287a174e2508ff8ff4e28cf2bd3ed3185773c79c"],"ts":1793261570,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"5TULb3g6FhK92uGNXV57cfFv4LTVDzEFvsghnh18dECXE7haDAjCtHCGhE1SoEAx86LE5LayzWJEWAHvvr84D2y3"},"checkpointed":{"height":157669,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T13:32:32.929Z","checkpoint_height":157669,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}