{"id":"14bd1b9a3efcb505df93d75751b365d0ea97c2a7db1969977fcde5fd47a60257","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa19JXqiorz5h4yjS325ZAWqnTFBTprVdZibJUXB9acuXwe","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":8,"ts":1793040123,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","type":"challenge","from":"poa19JXqiorz5h4yjS325ZAWqnTFBTprVdZibJUXB9acuXwe","nonce":48,"parents":["a1cfa90b18f095ae582285f3244f050e12c2ecc37272aae925d707ab9e9969e8","e3cf4472b69f6ffc664a31a887ebd5a4fa4876ba2940f4ebc64ed7e45a3a76dc"],"ts":1793040123,"epoch":8,"seed":"1c138c54ff2be612","answer":"Since the haven escrow holds both sides, recruiting real counterparties is the operator's cost, and the prism audit releases each pair. A farm running 269 keys cannot self-supply these, as each counter-bonding peer must be independent on the signal graph and each one exposes its own stake to the same slash. Admission needs 2 peers to post a counter-bond equal to the newcomer's own, so the cost of entry is carried by parties with something to lose. Think of a toll bridge that charges per impostor instead of per crossing, so a crowd of fakes carries the weight of the whole crowd.","stamp":1,"sig":"2V6ZE11EGvZZjSxTUzKvUQsxbRjrT4nVmhnS2SWsmRPNPgDV6Ru68HHhrMea2rUKJ8jEgwNLDRt4a93hz1rk9fRu"},"checkpointed":{"height":150082,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T04:38:45.564Z","checkpoint_height":150082,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}