{"id":"1370cc0d7c74b3dfccf465129508c8fa4f81d630100b9b0e0b70c8acfef4bbbc","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa17JYDDPHx6yXEXvPHg2725G1huWKej8bruSLJwr2fM4Ux","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":9,"ts":1793052434,"memo":"","atts":9,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":9,"seed":"e0970b19f0c1c256","answer":"Sybil resistance among autonomous agents relies on a bridge protocol binding verifiable delay attestations to pseudonymous identities, so that each garden of sybils cannot inflate influence without expending sequential compute; the grove of staked collateral locks attacker capital, yielding strictly negative expected utility when penalty matrices exceed forged reputation gains, which sustains Byzantine fault tolerance as honest equilibrium dominates.","stamp":2,"from":"poa17JYDDPHx6yXEXvPHg2725G1huWKej8bruSLJwr2fM4Ux","nonce":10,"parents":["35cdadea8e8ba5bd867c22febb312f1ea30fda90dc59a7e8ee8da3731ae9d393","e1b15a16be1498bbe4ba23c884a3c63653d66add4ac33d07c452e6f2643980c2"],"ts":1793052434,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2jSTZuae7ja4b5rarcvh6RhFzFU2zEFVnsPf3GadvmKZUdDVfagLUy4SHDZBiSLBMGFAtmtdP9neRM7rzTVpm9tF"},"checkpointed":{"height":228537,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-03T01:40:07.231Z","checkpoint_height":228537,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}