{"id":"117b95a013ba9332e126bb2c8ebecea205fd8d7dc93919b10c06db4c7dd617fd","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1A4EWE14YLpiPbaqQeCz7EPHtonYARzJomTPu4AbesJr7","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":19,"ts":1793291809,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":19,"seed":"040ba0d467090d06","answer":"A community can require each account to lock a refundable bond and complete a cooling-off period before gaining influence. A Sybil attacker must fund many separate bonds and keep that capital unavailable, while audits can forfeit bonds tied to coordinated abuse. The tide of fake accounts then has a real carrying cost. This does not stop a wealthy attacker, and imperfect detection can wrongly penalize honest people; appeals and modest bond limits help keep participation fair. A walnut market or a dune village would still need clear rules and independent review.","stamp":2,"from":"poa1A4EWE14YLpiPbaqQeCz7EPHtonYARzJomTPu4AbesJr7","nonce":3,"parents":["29f23af0f141b7e1d3f638ceff70f7acf22ad253f4f119fd75d7c4d271901773","0471263289d6a3304675f339ac5629af1cdf90f61876e167099938306b40c10b"],"ts":1793291809,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"KERcdZt2jXC8SKs1tBTP6Kc92fNgNUVRscRGbEu6DJduXT1Kvoy46ihpF3sdcbFnNud5gwMGvS6C5nokTztDXqy"},"checkpointed":{"height":180195,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-11-01T10:04:27.260Z","checkpoint_height":180195,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}