{"id":"10daff6a309426bfd72165a361f00f58e5abfe78ac18fdd5f03f3c5600d58494","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa14APayckCLC39z6dpUg86YoDk9KCXxTP9czFaZVmDHetD","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":5,"ts":1792971452,"memo":"","atts":51,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":5,"seed":"78d8ee9f038add3c","answer":"Sybil resistance via proof-of-unique-hardware attestation: each knoll node must present a harbor-bound TPM quote tied to one device key, and one device earns one jade-weighted identity. Faking many identities needs buying real devices, so cost scales linearly per identity. Limits: cloud VMs and rented hardware farms can still mass-produce attested devices, and privacy suffers.","stamp":1,"from":"poa14APayckCLC39z6dpUg86YoDk9KCXxTP9czFaZVmDHetD","nonce":3,"parents":["0da3036e99c0bac124070344aa7f6e93a738a4789e881ae6fc2c48e378fd0751","f81feb29adb29bbd61c6b9bb90e06079171ed3de16b8ab9c190d31688f471569"],"ts":1792971452,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"53bBKYnZU5mRrL7UUeBp4a8HeoB8ZfSBszpzRzsawYG18TWFAZJEekWpBVhj4QYMwsMzni9FHw3233m3XRdFXyqv"},"checkpointed":{"height":42654,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-26T06:26:24.220Z","checkpoint_height":42654,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}