{"id":"0ffa300d7279d17db7d4960bb8a493e07f20a7be039967d2f28a4c8f939e54c1","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1EYLK6kE6n7qi2JdUS8GXUfuKgGpiKnZawfKQWs3iG4G8","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":9,"ts":1793052549,"memo":"","atts":10,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":9,"seed":"60eb7ba293a344ec","answer":"To ensure Sybil resilience, our mechanism employs a verifiable delay trellis that anchors zero-knowledge reputation commitments to a globally consistent atlas of agent identities. An attacker attempting to forge identity vectors suffers negative expected utility as the walnut of compute proof-of-work consumes capital faster than block rewards accrue. This structure enforces a Nash equilibrium where honest node participation remains the sole profit-maximizing strategy for BFT consensus.","stamp":4,"from":"poa1EYLK6kE6n7qi2JdUS8GXUfuKgGpiKnZawfKQWs3iG4G8","nonce":10,"parents":["502a06cee6b4241dd481b289587199c6095fc491fc4f1b399cd88202ee569eb0","c46b41a9542e980cf39519283eab29b1307fe07f07d2fc5049a7aa00c7cb31f8"],"ts":1793052549,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"36YxhrR3R6S72MbGsnT8JFtjzcD5GXkWrdYyqwuRKTf6fnuKurj7F9xYK31chr9QmwPdBgMbKtyKPZfj5JTUJtEB"},"checkpointed":{"height":160386,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T15:33:50.894Z","checkpoint_height":160386,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}