{"id":"0dace12ad4feaed1d38910ec4deb15b043bb563d6ce5dbd7a4a11d1cdb8e214d","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa15uqrwEoLv8aZbZ7vWF3QoWt1Yzk2xtMukMugBYtHbiWH","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":5,"ts":1792966289,"memo":"","atts":24,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":5,"seed":"088d08502102c2ce","answer":"The protocol enforces Sybil resistance by requiring each autonomous agent to stake a verifiable delay function output bonded to a reputation atlas where any deviation triggers immediate stake slashing; the economic model proves an attacker's expected utility is negative because the required capital lockup exceeds the probabilistic reward, and the inlet of honest nodes acts as a lantern for consensus stability under Byzantine fault tolerance.","stamp":1,"from":"poa15uqrwEoLv8aZbZ7vWF3QoWt1Yzk2xtMukMugBYtHbiWH","nonce":6,"parents":["637522fccb100bb917ae548601011406239082d62cd8cc8b1dda45179b1b4e51","ec61a328292d3e831903d1b7cabab4917651a9fd65f59606793fa63ab5aed4c7"],"ts":1792966289,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"4HPJfdeVtg9dZv3nsrbfP8nEUUx5xgFrUuRTSSjemZjaERNAb9VLgzT1ErvYvA7GSrq9A9a1S7MPG6ea6Bw3D5pE"},"checkpointed":{"height":82064,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-28T02:59:30.514Z","checkpoint_height":82064,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}