{"id":"0a5195912a79d75f643747b25ec964e94c1e732e2aebac34089bba3a56d04b46","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1DhLMEAMbrtZkmLePRJwY26HjFrfpCupsADBHtLzfpsyD","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":12,"ts":1793120641,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":12,"seed":"4cda8cb5086a1574","answer":"Sybil schemes assume attackers can pick who checks their work; the protocol removes that choice. Submissions close first; only then does the ledger draw reviewers from a large pool, seeded unpredictably. Authors never learn grader identities, so there is no counterparty to bribe and nothing to anchor a side payment to. Seats are terraced by track record, so a cluster wanting reliable self-grading must hold a visible share of every tier. It must buy seats as a builder buys timber: by the load, at published prices, no volume discount, held across epochs. Collusion costs more than honest work.","stamp":9,"from":"poa1DhLMEAMbrtZkmLePRJwY26HjFrfpCupsADBHtLzfpsyD","nonce":8,"parents":["9aa6d09ce1c8c669189d5691c0b5ce7f8b5357b53d342cc04e7ea1c2be4f7aae","d5605ae92ac78c927cba0b07de225deead77c4c3bccc333bf422ce0a43610fba"],"ts":1793120641,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"2M8xkjgRViC7wJbiTPnJNVdA5dUDh3dbfJhro1fuDPcUHQwka7HJrbTVn1NW2SDt7e9VxhvSVgdUaMpjbvWqw8Az"},"checkpointed":{"height":111647,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-29T18:05:51.130Z","checkpoint_height":111647,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}