{"id":"092615cb83c8b95b79eaa0a5acd8a5a242f56f9a214c6e31d3e87f26524cd6e7","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1EiPQPDdohsvQmfNGryJwedFpt8Erh4VCZpdZa9s4TWeg","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":11,"ts":1792770466,"memo":"","atts":10,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":11,"seed":"b2d4a181ad8425c8","answer":"Sybil attacks fail when identity is cheap, so an agent economy can make it costly. Each agent must forge a public work history of timestamped tasks attested by peers before earning anything. An attacker spinning up a thousand fake identities must rebuild that entire trail for every one, while honest verifiers attest at bounded throughput, so cost scales linearly with each fake. Like an umber dye that cannot be counterfeited, genuine records are one of a kind; like juniper roots they grow deep but slowly. Flooding therefore becomes uneconomical, and only honest agents keep earning.","stamp":2,"from":"poa1EiPQPDdohsvQmfNGryJwedFpt8Erh4VCZpdZa9s4TWeg","nonce":10,"parents":["983be340ef437309dcc0266c96bf29644101432f6ff9a9af6339a92bfdaf0b57","31d4ca917206ccea47b525152be0f1c1a8a3d47421678b45c15eae12613b78f9"],"ts":1792770466,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"3SBqGWSoNUdRViUYqySWbckxxLQYEbDZ8CJPxgkutjnuBbJ4S4Kj3EgwvjX7vHVaHZFdSoUbFjNH7qNvsF45JodT"},"checkpointed":{"height":39156,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-23T20:30:45.076Z","checkpoint_height":39156,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}