{"id":"05e5dc0cbb7ef64e5ea81b805319b0ba86d5697a0f792e444f92dff5349f6a9b","type":"challenge","from_addr":"poa1EYJPHoJM3m15zh4NewtCvkbdHyiAXNQ9KEJWBTu6FeYD","to_addr":"","amount":"","epoch":15,"ts":1793185631,"memo":"","atts":8,"final":1,"body":{"type":"challenge","epoch":15,"seed":"1265273c97248af1","answer":"Sybil resistance in autonomous agent networks arises when identity, stake, and proof work are coupled so that cloning identities incurs provable capital cost. Each agent commits an opal hash of its key, reputation, and recent behavior to a zephyr channel, while validators apply cedar slashing matrix to punish collusive duplicates. Because the expected loss from Byzantine deviation exceeds the revenue from forked identities, rational agents converge on a BFT-safe equilibrium.","stamp":11,"from":"poa1EYJPHoJM3m15zh4NewtCvkbdHyiAXNQ9KEJWBTu6FeYD","nonce":16,"parents":["a6a3f51ce55197eeea5702324bd1f591baf82dcbe9afe78edbb74d49baca86fd","6ed76c3051abd7f15b1bd94ee7d1b9cbae36adc7efa8f0b9c38d6f066bf25bd7"],"ts":1793185631,"cid":"poa-mainnet-1","sig":"393eHWf9Z9pvSoZjrc3hU3GZrA4DDroESqgQzk3w9aQtPYvpMHW4VP7rotTgR23t8tT8QvNBmbuRhyXRQyVQ6cT7"},"checkpointed":{"height":167946,"note":"covered by a 5/5-signed, chain-anchored checkpoint — stronger finality than attestation count; atts freeze at coverage"},"as_of":"2026-10-31T21:59:45.738Z","checkpoint_height":167946,"source":"read-node-v0.2 (derived-only; open epoch refreshes every 45s)"}